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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of an income splitting system on marriage
partners. The focus is on the time allocation, on investment in marriage-
specific human capital and on the distribution of income within the family.
Two insights are discussed in detail. First, the distribution of tax-reduction
gains due to the income splitting system depends on whether the family
has been started or not. After marriage, joint taxation increases
redistribution among family members. Second, although the income
splitting system reduces the tax burden of the family, it might harm the
marriage partner that is more productive in household production provided
that potential marriage partners foresee the effects of joint taxation on the
family.
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Income splitting –
Is it good for both partners in the marriage?
I.  Introduction
Even in industrialized countries the tax treatment of marriages is quite heterogeneous [see
Messere (1998), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1993), Pechman
and Engelhardt (1990)]. Some countries such as Germany and the United States apply an
income splitting system, while others like France use a quotient system which includes children.
Support to couples by tax credits and tax allowances are given in several countries such as
Canada, Australia, Italy, the United Kingdom and Japan. In many countries one-earner cou-
ples are preferentially treated compared to two-earner couples. The tax consequences of
marriage are typically considerable [see, e.g., Rosen (1987)]. But the different systems lead to
substantial differences in the amount of tax reductions [see, e.g., Pechman and Engelhardt
(1990)].
Since Gary Becker initiated the economic analysis of the family [see Becker (1991)],
the various aspects of the family’s economic situation have been analyzed. Among others,
there is a large strand of literature both theoretical and empirical that focuses on the taxation of
married couples. First, equity and neutrality issues were discussed [see, e.g., Rosen (1977)].
While individual taxation violates horizontal equity with respect to married couples with equal
family income if the spouses’ earnings are different, joint taxation does not achieve horizontal
equity with respect to married couples and non-married couples. Second, the optimum-
taxation approach has been applied to married couples [the seminal papers are Boskin and
Sheshinski (1983) and Apps and Rees (1988)]. For example, the inverse elasticity rule rejects
the perfect income-splitting system and recommends a lower tax rate for women since the
women’s income elasticity of labor supply is typically higher than the men’s elasticity. Third,
the incidence of the marriage subsidy has been analyzed in detail. For example, Alm and
Whittington (1997) discussed the impact of marriage taxes and subsidies on the decision to
marry and, particularly, on the timing of marital decisions. Whittington and Alm (1997) consid-
ered the effect of income taxation on divorce.- 2 -
The basic question raised in this paper is whether both man and woman benefit from
the tax reduction due to an income-splitting system. The aim of this paper is twofold. On the
one hand, the impact of the tax approach towards married couples on before-marriage i n-
vestment in human capital that can be used in household production will be considered. On the
other hand, the distribution of the benefits caused by the tax reduction among family members
will be considered.
Investment in education prior to the marriage has been analyzed before, e.g., Konrad
and Lommerud (2000) have shown that individuals will overinvest in human capital that can be
used in the labor market. One scenario is that individuals will prepare themselves for a lot of
work in the outside labor market if the marriage partners will non-cooperatively decide on the
allocation of time and, therefore, will spend inefficiently little time in household production.
Another scenario is that individuals want to increase their fall-back utility level in order to
strengthen their position in a Nash-bargaining process. People that overinvest in market com-
patible skills underprovide family public goods such as well brought-up children, well-being of
elderly parents, etc.
In this paper the focus will be on investment in specific human capital that is useful in
household production. Education can either be exclusively aimed at the outside labor market
or it can also be oriented to household production and, particularly, to the bringing up of
children. For instance, general education and teaching training partially impart knowledge of
bringing up children. However, teachers, educators and nurses typically earn less money than
comparable professions. Furthermore, the percentage of women in these professions is ex-
traordinarily high. That might have to do with the usefulness of profession-specific knowledge
in bringing up children. For instance, in April 1998 in Germany, 9,8% of female workers
worked in the health services, while just 1,2% of male workers did. Similarly, 5,8% (0,9%) of
female (male) workers had a social profession and 4,4% (2,6%) were teachers. 90% of the
jobs in care of the body were filled by women [see Statistisches Bundesamt (1999)]. In the
European Union in 1995/96, the total proportion of female graduates was 53%, but in medical
science the percentage of women was 69% and in humanities, applied arts, and religion it was
71% [see Eurostat (1998)].- 3 -
This paper will analyze the impact of the tax treatment of marriages on investment in
human capital that is comparably useful in household production. A main question is whether
investment is encouraged or discouraged by joint filing and who benefits from joint taxation.
The paper also considers the effect of joint taxation on specialization and on the distri-
bution of income among family members during and after the bringing up of children. Of par-
ticular interest is whether both or only one spouse benefit from tax reductions and how intra-
family transfers will be adapted to a change in the tax treatment of marriage.
The paper is organized as follows. The discussion of the effects of income splitting on
family behavior and income distribution within the family is divided into two parts. While the
second section considers the family at the wedding day and after marriage, the third section
focuses also on investment decisions before marriage. A summarizing section brings the dis-
cussion to an end.
II.  At the wedding day and after marriage
The paper considers a family consisting of two people,  m , f i = , who make decisions. This
section focuses on the wedding day and the time thereafter. The marriage lasts at most two
periods. In the first period children are brought up; in the second period the marriage partners
just live together. The family has to decide how much time each member devotes to raising
children and how to distribute the income among the marriage partners. Utility is calculated in
income terms. For simplicity, it is assumed that only married partners have children and that
children are born in the first marriage period of their parents.
First, the second period is analyzed. The partners are married and had already de-
cided on the allocation of time to raise children. The woman had devoted  f R  hours to bring-
ing up children, hear husband  m R  hours. The less time an individual had worked outside the
household in the past, the less experienced it is and the less money it can earn now. Therefore,
the wage rate, w, is negatively correlated with the number of hours a person had devoted to
the children. This fact is captured by a negatively sloped and concave wage rate function
( ) i i R w w = . Since children had been brought up already, both family members use their
entire disposable time for working outside the household. The working hours of each individual
are normalized to one. Hence, gross labor income of individual i is  i w .- 4 -
Labor income is subject to a progressive income tax. The tax function, T, is continuos,
twice differentiable, increasing and convex as it is in Germany. Under an income splitting
system, the tax due from individual  i is  ( ) ( ) i j i w 1 w T T a - + a = ,  m , f j , i = ,  i j „ ,
2 / 1 0 £ a £ . While income would be perfectly split if  a were equal to one half, splitting
would only be partial if  2 / 1 0 < a < . With  a being zero, individual taxation instead of joint
taxation would be applied.
Since net family income can be distributed among the family members in any way, the
available income (utility) of the two marriage partners can be written as




m Z R w 1 R w T R w u - a - + a - = ,




f Z R w 1 R w T R w u + a - + a - = ,
where 
2 Z  denotes a transfer from the man to his wife, which might be either positive or nega-
tive.
1
In case of divorce, gross income is the same, but individuals are subject to individual
taxation. Hence, the tax burden of person i is  ( ) i i w T = Q . Some real costs such as lawyer’s
fees and some ‘psychic’ costs are connected with a divorce. The (positive) per-capita costs
are denoted by D. Whether or not the low-income individual is entitled to maintenance de-
pends basically on the law. Here, two somewhat extreme scenarios of maintenance obligations
are considered. Either no obligation to pay maintenance exists or the income net of taxes of the
former family members are equalized by maintenance payments. Hence, in case of a divorce,
the achievable income (utility) of the former marriage partners are
(2) ( ) ( ) ( ) D M R w T R w u m m
2
m - - - = ,
( ) ( ) ( ) D M R w T R w u f f
2
f - + - = ,
where M indicates the money transfer from the man to his former wife, which might be posi-
tive, negative or zero, depending on the law and on the allocation of time for raising children.
This paper assumes that the behavior of marriage partners in both periods can be
described by Nash bargaining. Nash bargaining has two main advantages. First, it ensures
                                                
1  Here and in the following, the superscripts 1 or 2 indicate the period under consideration.- 5 -
efficiency. This feature will become important later on. Second, Nash bargaining makes a
plausible prediction of the distribution of efficiency gains, which refers to the outside options,
i.e., to the threat points. Although one might argue that non-cooperative equilibrium within a
marriage is an adequate threat point [see, e.g., Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Konrad and
Lommerud (2000)], this paper uses the traditional divorce-threat-point bargaining approach
[see Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981)]. The latter is clearly the
natural approach in this section which only considers the distribution of income. But even in the
next section, which also deals explicitly with the allocation of time, non-cooperative behavior
seems to be somewhat strange since there are so many opportunities to cooperate within a
marriage. Pure non-cooperative behavior of marriage partners, which has been considered by,
e.g., Lundberg and Pollak (1994) and Konrad and Lommerud (1995), is particularly implau-
sible if the resultant equilibrium is inefficient. It should be possible for marriage partners to
enter into binding agreements to overcome inefficiency.
Marriage partners will stay together only if  ( ) D 2 T T f m f m - ‡ + - Q + Q , which is
always fulfilled since the tax savings due to the income splitting system (the LHS) are non-
negative.
Marriage partners that employ the divorce-threat Nash bargaining approach choose in
the second period the transfer 








m u u u u - - . The optimum
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The more in case of divorce the man’s net income exceeds his former wife’s net income and
the lower the maintenance payment after divorce is, the higher is the income share of the
husband and the lower is consequently the share of the wife.
2 If the maintenance payment
                                                
2  Recall that the maintenance payment is negative if the woman supports her former husband.- 6 -
equalized income net of taxes, the transfer would be  ( ) ( ) 2 T w T w Z f f m m
2 - - - =  and
spouse i would get  ( ) ( ) 2 T T w w u ˆ f m f m
2
i + - + = . Marriage partners income shares are the
same. Without a maintenance payment the difference in utility




m w w u ˆ u ˆ Q - - Q - = -  is independent of the tax system given the data of the first
period.
Now, consider the first period. In order to make things as simple as possible, the wage
rate w is exogenously given in the first period. The two potential marriage partners may marry
or not. If both stay alone, net of taxes they earn in every period  ) w ( T w -  each. Lifetime
utility would be  ( )( ) d + - = 1 ) w ( T w u , where d is the common discount factor. If they get
married, they will have children and they will have to spend part of their time to bring them up.
The working hours of individual i outside the household are  i R 1- . Spending time to raise
children has some psychic costs, taken into account by an increasing and convex cost function,
( ) i i R f = f . If a family member devotes only a few hours to the children, these costs are
probably negative but pleasure shrinks with the number of hours. Parents derive utility from
well educated children. This is also measured in income terms. There are no differences in
utility with respect to children. The utility of raising children is simply a weighted sum of the
numbers of hours devoted to the children. The weights are the (constant) marginal products in
education. The marginal products of family members,  m b  and  f b , are not necessarily the
same. Productivity differentials are due to inborn differences and to different training. How-
ever, this section takes the productivity differentials as exogenously given. By an either positive
or negative transfer from the man to the woman, 
1 Z , resources can be redistributed among
family members. Hence, utilities of married family members in period one are
(4)    ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1
f f m m m m f m
1
m Z R R R w R 1 1 w R 1 T w R 1 u - b + b + f - - a - + - a - - = ,
         ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1
f f m m f f m f
1
f Z R R R w R 1 1 w R 1 T w R 1 u + b + b + f - - a - + - a - - = .




i i u ˆ u u d + = .
Obviously, a necessary precondition for marriage is that total utility is higher than it
would otherwise be. When marriage partners also play a Nash-bargaining game on the wed-- 7 -
ding day, they choose the transfer, 
1 Z , so as to maximize  ( )( ) u u u u f m - - . Since, by as-
sumption, the threat points are the same, the transfer will equalize lifetime utilities, and thus
(5) ( ) ( )
2
T w R T w R
2













The higher, compared with his wife, the man’s utility in period 2 is, the lower his tax burden in
period 1 is. The lower his psychic costs of educating children are, and the lower the forgone
labor income is, the higher is the transfer from the man to his wife.
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An increase in the time spent by individual i for raising children changes in the second
period the tax savings due to the income splitting system according to










m f m a - a - - Q¢ ¢ =
¶
+ - Q + Q ¶
,    f , m i = ,  i j „ .
This term is zero if family members are also subject to individual taxation, i.e., if a is zero. The
term is certainly negative (positive) if individual i earns in period 2 more (less) money than the
spouse. A stronger dispersion in the allocation of time leads to higher tax savings.
The first-order conditions for an interior solution of the family’s utility maximization
problem are,  f , m i = ,  i j „ :
(8) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]
. 0














b + f¢ - a - - a - - a - - a - ¢ d =
¶
¶
The marginal increase in utility through better education of the children should be equal to the
marginal decrease in net income in present value terms plus the marginal psychic costs. These
conditions determine functions  ( ) a i R ,  f , m i = .- 8 -
As a benchmark case, consider first individual taxation, i.e., that a is zero. Both mar-
riage partners would spend just the same time with their children and earn the same money in
the second period if the man were as productive as the woman in bringing up children.
3 Re-
sources would not be transferred from the man to his wife in the first period. If the woman is
more productive in raising children than the man, she devotes a larger percentage of her time
to the children than her husband. Hence, she earns less money in the first period. Furthermore,
her labor income in the second period is smaller and her threat point, therefore, lower. The




m u ˆ u ˆ -  is positive, and, therefore, the first-period
transfer will be high.
Now, the effects of joint taxation, i.e., of an increase in a, will be analyzed. Since the
effects are in general considerably complex, the focus will only be on small deviations from
individual taxation, i.e., a small increase in a starting from a being zero. Total discounted utility
changes according to









m m f - - d + - - =
a
.
Furthermore, applying the implicit function theorem to (8), it can obtained for a being zero that
(10)    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )d - ¢ ¢ - ¢ + + f¢ ¢
- + - ¢ d + - + -
=
a ' T 1 w " T w " T w

























j i ,  f , m i = ,  i j „ .
Consider a small productivity asymmetry in raising children. Even under individual
taxation, the participation in the labor market of the person with the higher household-specific
productivity will be smaller and the second-period wage will be lower. Because of the pro-
gressive tax system, this person faces a lower marginal tax rate. If a step in the direction of
joint taxation is put forward, both family members are better off (as can be seen from (9)).
Due to the nature of Nash bargaining, the marriage partners will benefit equally. Furthermore,
the family members will specialize even more.
4 As a consequence, transfers in the first and in
                                                
3  Note that any differences in psychic costs and labor-market productivity are assumed away.
4  This can be concluded from (10) if the second-order conditions of the family’s utility-maximization
problem are taken into account.- 9 -
the second period will be increased. The person that is more productive at home has to be
compensated for less labor income.
It is also worthwhile to analyze how a change in the tax treatment of marriages affects
old families that had already brought up children. Hence, consider the introduction of a (par-
tial) income-splitting system at the beginning of the second period. Provided that wages are
different, both family members benefit equally. This will be ensured by higher transfers from the
high-income individual to its spouse. The transfer changes according to
( )( ) 2 T T w w d dZ f m f m
2 ¢ + ¢ - = a .
Whether the tax reform takes place at the beginning or in the middle of the marriage,
the Nash-bargaining procedure ensures a uniform distribution of benefits. Not surprisingly,
joint taxation requires more redistribution within the family since the primary net market i n-
comes are more unequally distributed. To summarize:
Proposition  1: Both family members benefit equally from the introduction of an i ncome-
splitting system. By means of higher transfers it can be ensured that also the low-income indi-
vidual benefits. If the tax reform is announced at the beginning of the marriage, family members
that are differently productive educators specialize even more than under individual taxation. #
III.  Before Marriage and thereafter
This section also considers a two-person-family. However, it focuses on investment in mar-
riage-specific human capital before marriage. It is assumed that potential marriage partners
already know each other when they invest. Investment before marriage,  i I , determines the
productivity of individual i in raising children. For simplicity, investment in human capital does
not affect the productivity in the outside labor market. Hence, the wage rate, w, is a constant.
The outcome of raising children is again an additive function in the time variables  m R  and  f R :
( ) i f , m i i R I ￿ = b , where  ( ) 0 0 > b . But the marginal productivity in household production,
( ) i i i I b = b , is an increasing and concave function of investment. Note that the individuals
possibly differ in productivity. In this section, a person i is designated as always more produc-
tive than person j if  ( ) ( ) I I j i b > b  for all  0 I ‡ . The costs of investment, whether real or ‘psy-
chic’, are described by an increasing and convex function  ( ) i i I j = j . These costs are borne- 10 -
by the investing individual. The total time per person available for working outside and inside
the households is again constant and normalized to one. Psychic costs of spending time with
the children,  i f , have the same properties as before. Now, the marriage consists of just one
period. Furthermore, the tax system is the same as in the previous section.
Once investments are sunk, the two persons under consideration decide on marriage
and on the time allocation with respect to raising children. Then, total remaining family utility
measured in income terms can be written as
5
(11) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ￿
„
=
b + f - - a - + - a - - =
i j
f , m i
i i i i j i R I 2 R w R 1 1 w R 1 T w R 1 u ~ .
Obviously, total family utility is  ( ) ( ) f m I I u ~ u j - j - = . Either one threatens to refuse mar-
riage, so the threat point of individual i is  ( ) i i I ) w ( T w u j - - = . Both will get married only if
(12) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 R w R R I 2 T
f , m i
i i i i
f , m i
i i ‡ f - - b + - Q ￿ ￿
= =
.
The tax savings plus the net benefit from having children, i.e., the second term on the LHS,
have to be positive.
In a Nash-bargaining game the two potential marriage partners decide on the alloca-
tion of time and the distribution of utility among them. Because of the linearity, the family will
distribute resources such that finally member i gets









u ˆ j - =
-
+ = ,    f , m i = ,  i j „ .
6
The individual which invested less is ultimately better off since the other person free rides to a
larger extent.
Given the levels of investment, the family maximizes u ~ by choosing the time allocation.
The first-order conditions for an interior solution are,  f , m i = ,  i j „ :
(14) ( ) [ ] 0 T 1 T 1 w 2
R
u ~
i i j i
i




                                                
5  For simplicity discounting is neglected.- 11 -
The marginal increase in direct utility of brought up children should be equal to the sum of
marginal losses in net labor income and of the marginal psychic costs. Household production
time  i R  and Investment  i I  are positively correlated. Hence, the higher the marginal produc-
tivity in household production, the more time is spent within the household. The two conditions
(14) determine functions  ( ) f m i I , I , R a ,  f , m i = . Note that under individual taxation the
number of hours individual i works in the household is independent of the investment of its
spouse.
Before marriage each individual decides independently on investment in specific human
capital. If the individuals take the result of the Nash-bargaining procedure at the wedding day
into account, they choose investment so as to each maximize  i u ˆ . At the Nash equilibrium at






































,    f , m i = .
Since the term in square brackets is zero, at the Nash equilibrium the marginal increase in
children-training productivity should simply be equal to the marginal investment costs.
The Nash equilibrium is inefficient since, at the Pareto optimum,  i i iR 2 j¢ = b¢  should be
fulfilled. Non-altruistic individuals ignore the positive direct impact of their investment on the
utility of their (potential) marriage partners. Starting at a Nash equilibrium, the marginal costs of
investment and therefore investment itself should be higher. To summarize:
Proposition 2: At the Nash equilibrium, the two non-altruistic individuals would benefit from
higher joint investment in marriage-specific human capital. #
Bringing up children is simply a marriage-specific public good [see, e.g., Lundberg and
Pollak (1994) and Konrad and Lommerud (2000)]. By investing in specific human capital,
potential marriage partners voluntarily contribute to the public good. Underprovision due to the
opportunity to free ride is the well known result.
                                                                                                                                              
6  Here and in the following, the utility values are evaluated at the optimum time parameter values.- 12 -
The conditions (15) determine functions  ( ) a i I ,  f , m i = . Applying the implicit function
theorem at  0 = a  leads to
7
(16) ( ) ( )
( )( ) i
2
i i i i
2
i
i j i j i i i
T w R 2
R R T w T T w
d
dI
¢ ¢ + f¢ ¢ j¢ ¢ - b¢ ¢ + b¢
- ¢ ¢ + ¢ - ¢ b¢
=
a
,    f , m i = ,  i j „ .
A small deviation from individual taxation gets individual i to invest more if this person
has already spent more time with the children and faces therefore a lower marginal tax rate
than the spouse. Hence, while the individual that is more productive in the household will
increase investment, its spouse will reduce investment. The effect of (partial) joint taxation on
total investment is ambiguous and depends on the functional form of costs, taxes and produc-
tivity. Utility changes according to
(17)
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) j
2
j j j j
2
j
j i j i j j
j




T w R 2
R R T w T T w
2




u ˆ u ˆ
d
u ˆ d
¢ ¢ + f¢ ¢ j¢ ¢ - b¢ ¢ + b¢
- ¢ ¢ + ¢ - ¢ b¢
j¢ +










f , m j , i = ,  i j „ . The direct effect is clearly positive provided that there is some asymmetry in
the family. Since the indirect effect is either positive or negative, the sign of the total effect is
ambiguous. Either both or only one marriage partner will benefit from the change towards
income splitting. There is the possibility that the tax reform harms one individual because its
(potential) spouse reduces investment heavily. Since it is the less productive person that will
invest less under income splitting, the individual that is more productive in household produc-
tion might be the one to suffer. The following proposition states this result.
Proposition  3: The individual that is always less productive in household production will
benefit more than its spouse by a small step towards income splitting. The spouse might even
be harmed by the change in the tax system.  #
Since well brought-up children are considered as a public good within the family and
investment in household-production-specific human capital is a voluntary contribution to the
                                                
7  Because of the second-order conditions, the denominator is negative.- 13 -
public good, the results of this section reproduce, in principle, results that have already been
discussed in the literature on private provision of public goods.
8 In fact, Ihori (1996) investi-
gated productivity differentials in contributing to public goods.
9 He found out that contributors
with high productivity do not necessarily achieve high utility levels. The analysis carried out by
this paper confirms his result. However, the frameworks employed by Ihori and in the ones
this paper differ from each other. While Ihori considered direct contributions to a public good,
this paper focused on more indirect contributions. Both family members jointly decide on the
public good quantity by determining the allocation of time. However, the marriage partners
independently contribute to the public good by their decisions on their productivity.
10
IV.  Concluding remarks
This paper has analyzed the effects of an income splitting system on marriage partners. The
focus was on the time allocation, on investment in marriage specific human capital, and on the
distribution of income within the family.
The starting point was that the distribution of tax-reduction gains due to the income
splitting system depends on whether the family has been started or not. First, if joint filing is not
introduced earlier than the wedding day, both family members benefit. By means of higher
transfers it can be ensured that also the low-income individual benefits. If the tax reform is
announced at the beginning of the marriage, family members that are differently productive
educators specialize even more than under individual taxation.
Second, if a partial income splitting system is introduced long before marriage, the
individual that is always less productive in household production will benefit more than its
spouse by a small step towards income splitting. The spouse might even be harmed by the
change in the tax system.
                                                
8  A good introduction to this literature is Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986).
9  Buchholz and Konrad (1995) considered productivity differentials and strategic transfers before the
contributions have to be made. Wrede (1998) considered strategic changes in productivity.
10  The interaction between non-cooperative contributions and cooperative contributions determined by
Nash bargaining has been discussed by Hoel (1991).- 14 -
Not only in Germany the income-splitting system is currently being tested. Although the
paper has not analytically discussed the complete transition from the perfect income-splitting
system to individual taxation, one is tempted to use the intuition presented in the paper to
speculate about a non-marginal reform such as that. Already married partners will suffer from
the increase in the tax burden. The same holds true for couples that consider marriage at the
moment of the reform. These couples will allocate the time more evenly than under the income
splitting system. Whether young people that actually organize their education and plan to marry
later on benefit or suffer is not clear. Individuals that are more productive in household pro-
duction and, particularly, in bringing up children might benefit in spite of the higher tax burden
for families. Hence, particularly, if the additional tax revenue is taken into account, a provoca-
tive conclusion of the paper is that young women are certainly the winners provided that
women’s productivity in bringing up children is higher. Old married couples and young men are
the losers of a change from joint taxation to individual taxation.- 15 -
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